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ABSTRACT.  This study developed a model of the variables independent audit committee, 
voluntary disclosure, information asymmetry and volume of transaction in order to 
investigate the direct and indirect effect among the built variables. Data were collected 
from annual reports of banking companies listed on IDX. The Hypotheses testing 
performed with a variance-based approach using Smart- PLS in the data processing. The 
results of this study confirmed that an increase of the number independent audit committee 
members can effectively perform their overseeing function over management in order to 
make a better voluntary disclosure, reduced information asymmetry and increased volume 
of transaction. The findings of this study become more special where this research 
emphasizes the importance of corporate information disclosure to the public. Voluntary 
disclosure can significantly mediate the effect of independent audit committees on a volume 
of transaction, moreover, a high voluntary disclosure has a direct significant effect in 
reducing the level of information asymmetry so that the information asymmetry can be a 
mediating variable for the effect of voluntary disclosure on a volume of transaction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Indonesia’s stock market showed an increasing number of issuers and single 
investors identification (SID), by the year of 2014 the recorded issuers were 510 companies 
that continue to rise, becoming 539 companies in 2016. There was also an increase of SID 
from 18,83 % in 2014 becoming 23,47 % in 2016. The increase in the number of issuers 
and SID should be followed by an increase in the volume of transaction. This should 
indicate that the investors are increasingly trusting the capital markets, as an alternative to 
investing with an expectation of achieving satisfactory returns in the future (Ady, et al., 
2013). 
On the other hand, there may be risks of losses faced by investors. To reduce the 
risk that might happen because of decreasing price, investors can refer to the volume of 
transaction in making investment decisions. A high volume of transaction is a reflection of 
high demand and can boost stock price increases (Chae, 2005). The fact that occurred in 
Indonesia that even though there was an increase in the number of new issuers and SID, 
but the volume of transaction is still considered low and the spread of stock price is 
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relatively large. This indicates that the market is still inefficient, where investors act 
irrationally in taking investment decisions, compared to other Asian countries such as 
Korea, Singapore, and some other countries (Mukhtaruddin et al., 2014; Purwanti & 
Kurniawan, 2013; Mensi, 2012). A study has shown that at the low of information 
asymmetry will significantly influence on to the increase of volume of the transaction 
(Alsahlawi & Ammer, 2017). An efficient market is reflected with the number of relevant 
and high quality of information submitted to the public so as to find a low information 
asymmetry (Ferguson, 2015). One of the regulatory efforts to reduce the level of 
information asymmetry in Indonesia is reflected in the circular letter of Indonesia Financial 
Services Authority No.32/SEOJK.04/2015 which requires going public companies to 
present a transparent financial report to users. The regulation is a form of management 
accountability to users. 
The major cases, such as Enron, Tyco, Worldcom, Lippo Bank, Citibank, and other 
big cases indicate that it is important to have better oversight over corporate, including the 
implementation of corporate governance. The presence of independent audit committees 
can improve function to oversight of the financial reporting process and may increase 
voluntary disclosure (Samaha et al., 2015). Corporate governance can improve information 
disclosure and lead to greater transparency, the presence of independent audit committees 
and voluntary disclosure will able to reduce information asymmetry (Alves et al., 2015; 
Bhasin, 2016). A low scope of reporting can lead on high information asymmetry (Billet 
et al., 2016) by providing more information and doing more disclosure than required will 
give a good signal for investors and it can increase the liquidity and volume of the 
transaction (Schoenfeld, 2017). 
Based on the above descriptions, this study becomes very important to identify the 
effect of the independent audit committee on voluntary disclosure and information 
asymmetry, the effect of voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry and volume of 
transaction, and the influence of information asymmetry on the volume of transaction. This 
study differs from previous studies in which the study is conducted with a variance-based 
approach to test the hypotheses, also the study to examine whether voluntary disclosure 
and information asymmetry partially and simultaneously can mediate the variables 
according to the model constructed. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Independent Audit Committee on Voluntary Disclosure  
Overseeing over financial reporting process conducted by management will be 
more effective by the presence of an independent audit committee (Madi, et al., 2014; 
Kantudu & Samaila, 2015). It is because independent audit committees are neutral and they 
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are accountable to the board of commissioners (Setiany et al., 2017). Independent audit 
committees have more opportunities to control and reduce the opportunity of agents to 
retain information for their own benefit (Allegrini & Grecco, 2013), able to oversee the 
transparency of the financial statement process and reduce information asymmetry (Ferrero 
et al., 2015). Therefore the existence of an independent audit committee will increase the 
volume and quality of information disclosed to the public (Latridis, 2013). 
The previous study found out that there was no effect of an independent audit 
committee on the level of voluntary disclosure (Othman, et al., 2014; Ramadhan, 2014). 
However, research conducted by Setiany et al., (2017) shown there was a significant effect 
of independent audit committee members on voluntary disclosure, which is in line with the 
findings that stated there was the significant influence of independent audit committee 
members on information transparency and voluntary disclosure (Felo et al., 2009). 
 
Independent Audit Committee on Information Asymmetry 
The presence of audit committee in the organization will improve monitoring of 
financial reporting process, to produce more reliable financial information, as well as to 
improve the quality and openness of information to the public (Bedard & Gendron, 2010). 
The companies with an adequate size of the independent audit committee will have a better 
process of monitoring over financial statement preparation and a better public disclosure 
quality. It is because the independent audit committee member tend to be more objective 
and more effective in performing their duties, where they have no direct personal interest 
to management or to the company (Beasley & Salterio, 2001; Madi et al., 2014; Alfraih & 
Almutawa, 2017). It further found that the existence of an independent audit committee 
has made the information asymmetry became smaller (Allegrini & Greco, 2013) and also 
protect the rights of minority shareholders (Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010; Bhasin et al., 
2012). 
Studies have shown that the existence of independent audit committee members 
has a significant effect on increasing information disclosure (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; 
Allegrini & Greco 2013), and may reduce information asymmetry (El-Mahdy et al., 2013; 
Bhasin, 2016; Bansal & Sharma, 2016). In another study different result have been found, 
a big independent audit committee member can not significantly affect on increasing 
information disclosure (Bedard & Gendron, 2010). 
 
Voluntary Disclosure on Information Asymmetry 
Agent as an internal part of the company is more informed of the circumstances 
and prospects of the company, while external parties are relatively limited and it can lead 
to information asymmetry (Abdioglu et al., 2015; Han et al., 2014).  
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Signals are the result of actions taken by management in providing messages or 
indications and messages to investors about how the prospect of the company (Bergh & 
Gibsons, 2011). Disclosure of information can be a signal and an effort to overcome the 
problems of information asymmetry occurs between principal and agent (Jiang et al., 
2011). Voluntary disclosure and internet-based disclosure can reduce information 
asymmetry (Ferrero et al., 2015), although it does not directly affect the credibility of the 
company (Gajewski & Li, 2015). Performing voluntary disclosure more than required 
indicates an openness that can be a corporate strategy to attract investors by reducing 
information asymmetry (Shroff et al., 2013; Allegrini & Grreco, 2013; Sihombing et al., 
2017). 
 
Voluntary Disclosure on Volume of Transaction 
The volume of transaction describes the activity of shares traded and demanded by 
investors wchich can be an interpretation of news circulating in the market on the valuation 
of traded products (Chiu & Chau, 2014). To increase the volume of transaction and to face 
competition in the stock market, the agent should perform better voluntary disclosure 
(Alberti et al., 2012). 
There are two determinant factors for voluntary disclosure, namely motivation and 
constraint. Voluntary disclosure is an effort conducted by management to deliver public 
information if the benefits obtained will be greater than the cost incurred (Shehata, 2014). 
Some studies have found that the increase of voluntary disclosure may increase stock 
liquidity and also increase the volume of the transaction (Gunawan & Lina, 2015; 
Schoenfeld, 2017; Ajina et al., 2015; Bischof & Daske, 2013). Other studies have found 
that disclosure can make the market inefficient if the company delivers untrue information 
so that stock prices and volume of the transaction can be ridiculed through disclosure (Wen, 
2012). 
 
Information Asymmetry on Volume of Transaction 
The number of shares traded in trading days is called the volume of the transaction 
(Abbondante, 2010). It is a measure of stock liquidity, as it may reflect how many shares 
were sold by the previous shareholders and bought by other investors (Ahmad & Sar, 
2016). Small bid-ask-spreads reflect low levels of investment risk because there is 
symmetric information among management and market participants (Fuhrmann et al., 
2016). The investors in the stock market will prefer to trade on instruments with a small 
bid-ask spread, it is the reason why the instruments with small bid-ask spreads are more 
actively traded (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). On the other occasion, it was shown that 
investors ignore the information submitted by management to the public, so the volume of 
the transaction was not determined by information submitted (DellaVigna & Pollet, 2009).  
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research is a confirmatory explanatory study, the hypotheses made and tested 
to explore how the direct and indirect effect of the exogenous variables on the endogenous 
variables in accordance with the research model built. The effect among variables is 
illustrated by path model, where the variables studied are independent audit committee, 
voluntary disclosure, information asymmetry and volume of transaction. 
The data used are secondary data, that is annual report data obtained from the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange website on banking companies throughout the year 2014-2016. 
There are 43 listed banks since January 1, 2014 and there are 4 new listed banks after 
January 1, 2014. Thus, the sample in this study is 39 banks representing all banks in 
Indonesia. Hypotheses testing for direct and indirect effect is done with variance based 
approach using Smart-PLS. 
Independent audit committees are measured using the number of independent audit 
committees members in every observation year (Samaha et al., 2015; Setiany et al., 2017; 
Felo et al., 2009). Measurement for voluntary disclosure is performed with content 
analysis, given the number "1" if the company discloses and the number "0" if the company 
does not disclose items of the disclosure. The variables of voluntary disclosure in this study 
consist of 8 disclosure classifications, namely general corporate information, corporate 
strategy, corporate governance, financial performance, risk management, non-financial 
key, corporate social and other information.  
The information asymmetry is measured from the average bid-ask spread on April 
1-15 of 2015-2017 (the date after the last official annual report published on the IDX 
website) throughout the year of observation. The occurrence of information asymmetry 
characterized by the greater bid-ask spread (Fuhrmann et al., 2016; Abad et al., 2015). The 
volume of transaction variables seen from the number of shares traded (Abbondante, 2010; 
Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Ahmad & Sarr, 2016). This study used the volume of the 
transaction during April 1-15 of 2015-2017 to measure the volume of transaction variables. 
To avoid the big differences distance in numbers among research variables, before the 
hypothesis testing performed the numbers on the variables of information asymmetry and 
volume of the transaction are transformed using natural logarithms. 
 
RESULTS 
There are 43 banks listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the year of 2014-
2016, while there are 4 banks that recorded its issuance of shares after January 1, 2014, so 
there are 39 banks put into the sample of research than this study uses 117 data observation. 
The findings of the indirect effect test in this study indicated that voluntary 
disclosure can mediate the effect of independent audit committees on the volume of 
transaction. The indirect effect testing results also found that information asymmetry can 
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have a significant effect of voluntary disclosure on the volume of transaction. The existence 
of independent audit committee members is a very important issue to be applied in an effort 
to oversee the financial reporting process and to improve disclosure of information that is 
beneficial to stakeholders. The disclosure of information that more than mandatory will 
enrich investors knowledge about company information, will increase investors interest in 
buying stock, will make the market more passionate about the transaction and will increase 
the volume of stock transaction in Indonesia banking company. 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUTIONS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistical results of this research variables were analyzed and 
interpreted objectively as can be seen from the mean, minimum, maximum and standard 
deviation (found in Table 1). The average existence of independent audit committee 
members is close to 4 persons, but there are banks with 2 independent audit committee 
members, with a maximum of 6 members. In the circular letter of Indonesia Financial 
Services Authority No.32/SEOJK.04/2015 which recommends that the go public company 
has at least 3 members of the independent audit committee in order to be able to oversee 
the function in financial reporting process more effectively. Data showed that value of 
standard deviation is smaller than the mean value for independent audit committee (0.905 
<3.547), the data of the independent audit committee has a low variability position 
compared with its mean. 
Table 1 shown that from 48 voluntary disclosure items, the average achievement 
score for voluntary disclosure was 67.2%, with a minimum score of 38% and a maximum 
of 85%. It showed a smaller standard deviation value than its mean (0.098<0.672),  which 
means that there is a lower spread of observational data than the average available data.  
Further details of the voluntary disclosures occurred, indicating that the existing 
banks tend to disclose only general information. Management realizes that making a larger 
disclosure of such classifications can lead to the high cost and can pose a threat in the 
competition (Beattie & Thomson, 2007: Gregory et al., 2004). 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 Mean Minimum Maximum Std. 
Deviation 
Independen audirt committee 
Voluntary disclosure 
Information asymmetry  
Volume of transaction (in lot) 
3.547 
0.672 
82.00 
9,990,149 
2.000 
0.380 
1.00 
28 
6.000 
0.850 
1,845.00 
236,445,911 
0.905 
0.098 
277.00 
25,546,013 
 
9 
 
This study uses a stock price spread as a reflection of information asymmetry, 
calculated from the average bid-ask price of 1 to 15 April after the company's annual 
reporting period. Table 1 showed that the minimum information asymmetry (as reflected 
in the stock price spread) was IDR 1, while the maximum value was IDR 1,845. 
Information asymmetry has a standard deviation of 277 which is greater than the mean 
value of price spread. This showed that there has been a high spread of data for information 
asymmetry. This result indicates that information asymmetry is still occurring and that the 
banking stock market in Indonesia is still in an inefficient market (Mukhtaruddin et al., 
2014; Ady, et al., 2013). 
Table 1 also shown that the average volume of the stock transaction was 9,990,149, 
with a minimum value of 28 which means that there is a certain day where the stock trading 
transaction was a very small amount, the maximum value was 236,445,911. The volume 
of the transaction has a standard deviation of 25,546.013 greater than the mean value, there 
was a higher data variability than the average. 
Hypotheses Testing 
  Table 2 shows the correlation among research variables and the contribution of 
exogenous variables toward endogenous variables in accordance with the research model 
built. The overall found that the relationship between variables in this study belongs to the 
group of very low up to moderate. There is a very low correlation between the independent 
audit committee and the information asymmetry. The relationship between information 
asymmetry and volume of transaction is classified as a moderate, while the relationship 
between other variables according to this study is found in a weak classification. 
 
Table 2. Correlation and R square 
Variables Independent 
audit 
committee 
Voluntary 
disclosure 
Information 
asymmetry 
Volume of 
transaction 
 
R2 
Independent audit 
committee 
1.000 0.278 -0.125 0.230  
Voluntary disclosure 0.278 1.000 -0.210 0.313 0.077 
Information asymmetry -0.125 -0.210 1.000 -0.403 0.049 
Volume of transaction 0.230 0.313 -0.403 1.000 0.216 
 
The coefficient of determination (R2) indicates that the independent audit 
committee contributes 7.7% to voluntary disclosure. The resulting of R2 also shows that 
4.9% of information asymmetry can be determined by the independent audit committee 
and voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, it was found that R2 for the volume of transaction 
is 21.6%, which is the contribution of voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry. 
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Although the results of this study shown a very weak up to moderate relationship among 
variables and the contribution of exogenous variables to endogenous was small, but then 
according to the research model that has been built, this study further to find out whether 
there is a significant effect between exogenous variables on endogenous variables in 
accordance with the research hypotheses. 
This research conducted at α = 5%, based on the rule of thumb inner test model the 
results are significant when tstat> 1.96 or at P value <0.05. The research model is path 
analysis, there are 9 hypotheses developed to be tested with a variance based analysis 
approach (using Smart-PLS). The results of testing the direct effects among variables can 
be found in Figure 1 summarized in Table 3 and explained further below. 
Figure 1. Full Diagram 
 
 
Independent audit committee significantly affects voluntary disclosure with a path 
coefficient of 0.278 and tstat of 3,432  which mean H1 is accepted. A positive path 
coefficient signified that the increase in the number of independent audit committee 
members was also followed by the increasing of voluntary disclosure level. The high total 
number of independent audit committee member provided better oversight in the process 
of delivering information and its information content to the public, resulting in higher 
levels of disclosure. This result supported previous studies (Madi et al., 2014; Samaha, et 
al., 2015; Setiany et al., 2017; Barros et al., 2013).  
The total number of independent audit committee member can not significantly 
effect on information asymmetry with a path coefficient of -0.073 and tstat of 1.594, which 
means H2 is rejected. A negative path coefficient indicated that the increasing number of 
independent audit committee member simultaneously their movement with the decreasing 
of information asymmetry. Although the effect was insignificant, independent audit 
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committee members performed their function in an effort to reduce the level of information 
asymmetry. This result is in line with previous research stated that there is no significant 
difference between firms that have a large independent audit committees and who have 
small ones in order to minimize information asymmetry (Bedard & Gendron, 2010), while 
it was contradicted with the ones stated that the independent audit committees have a 
significant effect on reducing information asymmetry by improving the quality of financial 
statements (El-Mahdy et al., 2013; Bhasin, 2016; Bansal & Sharma, 2016). 
Voluntary disclosure has a significant effect on information asymmetry with a path 
coefficient of -0.190 and tstat of 2,539, H3 is accepted. A negative value on the path 
coefficient indicates that an increase of voluntary disclosure was also followed by a 
decreasing of information asymmetry. The increasing of valuable information submitted 
by management as an agent (Abdioglu et al., 2015) is a better description of disclosure, 
with better disclosure then the stakeholders will obtain information with better quantity 
and quality so that the level of information asymmetry can be mitigated (Gajewski & Li, 
2015; Shroff et al., 2013; Allegrini & Grreco, 2013). 
 
Table 3. Path Analysis Result 
 
Path 
coefficient 
T Statistics 
 
P value 
 
Hypotheses 
Independent audit committee           Voluntary 
disclosure  
0.278 3.432 
0.001 Supported 
Independent audit committee            Information 
asymmetry 
-0.073 1.594 
0.111 Not- 
supported 
Voluntary disclosure           Information 
asymmetry 
-0.190 2.539 
0.011 Supported 
Voluntary disclosure            Volume of 
transaction 
0.239 2.743 
0.006 Supported 
Information asymmetry           Volume of 
transaction 
-0.352 5.653 
0.000 Supported 
 
Voluntary disclosure has a significant effect on the volume of the transaction with 
a path coefficient of  0.239 and tstat of 2.743, then H4 is accepted. A positive path 
coefficient showed that the increase of voluntary disclosure coincided with the increase of 
volume of banking stock transactions. The result of this study was in line with the previous 
finding said that with increasing voluntary disclosure may increase stock liquidity and 
volume of transaction, which is also characterized by a more efficient market (Gunawan & 
Lina, 2015; Schoenfeld, 2017; Ajina et al., 2015; Bischof & Daske , 2013).  
Information asymmetry has a significant effect on the volume of the transaction 
with a path coefficient of -0.352 and tstat of  5.653, H5 was accepted. A negative path 
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coefficient indicated that the lower information asymmetry coincided with the direction of 
movement with an increase in the volume of banking stock transactions in Indonesia. The 
result of this study are in line with previous research which says that the decrease in spreads 
(as an indication of low information asymmetry) will increase the volume of transaction 
and make the stocks more liquid (Wang & Yau, 2000; Chae, 2005; Frank & Gracia, 2009; 
Ady , et al., 2013; Garnia et al., 2014; Santoso & Mogie, 2015; Ferguson, 2015). There are 
also other findings that do not support this result, stating that there is no significant effect 
between bid-ask spreads and the volume of the transaction (DellaVigna & Pollet, 2009). 
Table 4 outlines the results of hypotheses testing the indirect effects among 
variables built with the variance-based approach using Smart-PLS 3. This variance-based 
approach concludes the test results to be significant if the t statistics > 1.96 or at P value 
<0.05. One of the hypotheses testing result showed that the t statistics value of the indirect 
effect of the independent audit committee on information asymmetry through voluntary 
disclosure is 1,927 < ttable1.96 then H6 is rejected. It can be concluded that indirectly 
through voluntary disclosure, an independent audit committee has no significant effect on 
information asymmetry.  
 
Table 4. Specific Indirect Effects 
Indirect path 
T 
statistics 
P 
values 
Hypotheses 
Independent audit committee -> Voluntary disclosure -> Information 
asymmetry  
1.927 0.054 
Not-
supported 
Independent audit committee -> Voluntary disclosure -> Volume of 
transaction  
2.009 0.045 
Supported 
Independent audit committee -> Information asymmetry -> Volume of 
transaction 
1.403 0.161 
Not-
supported 
Voluntary disclosure -> Information asymmetry -> Volume of transaction 2.458 0.014 Supported 
Independent audit committee -> Voluntary disclosure -> Information 
asymmetry -> Volume of transaction 
1.858 0.063 
Not- 
supported 
 
The test results in Table 4 also shown that the t statistics indirect effect of the 
independent audit committee on the volume of the transaction through voluntary disclosure 
is 2,009> ttable 1.96 then H7 is accepted. Indirectly through voluntary disclosure, the 
independent audit committee has a significant effect on the volume of transaction. The 
existence of a bigger independent audit committee as a supervisor also functions to 
supervise management to provide a better disclosure (Allegrini & Greco, 2013), in this 
condition the investors will be more confident about the quality of financial statements 
prepared by management, further will impact on the increasing to the volume of stock 
transaction in the market (Schoenfeld, 2017). 
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Another result also has shown that the statistics indirect effect of the independent 
audit committee on the volume of the transaction through information asymmetry is 1.403 
< ttable 1.96 then H8 is rejected. It indicated that indirectly through information 
asymmetry, the independent audit committee has no significant effect on the volume of 
transaction. The level of information asymmetry in Indonesia banking companies is still 
high, it is reflected by the bid-ask spread. Information presented by management to the 
public is not regarded as an effective and optimal tool to assist users in making stock 
investment decisions.  
The result of the hypothesis testing also indicated that the value of t statistics for 
the indirect effect of voluntary disclosure on a volume of the transaction through 
information asymmetry is 2,458 > ttable 1.96 then H9 is accepted. The voluntary disclosure 
has a significant effect on the volume of the transaction when mediated by information 
asymmetry. High disclosure able to attract investors and it should also be a signal that the 
agent worked for the interest of the principal. Furthermore, voluntary disclosure is able to 
reduce information asymmetry, to increase transparency and to protect the rights of 
minority shareholders (Ferrero et al., 2015; Shehata, 2014; Fathi, 2013).  
The final hypothesis testing in this study is to find out whether voluntary disclosure 
and information asymmetry can simultaneously mediate the effect of an independent audit 
committee on the volume of transaction. As the result of this testing shows that the t 
statistics of 1.858 < 1.96 it is concluded that H10 rejected, voluntary disclosure and 
information asymmetry simultaneously have no significant effect to mediate the effect of 
the independent audit committee on the volume of transaction.  
 
CONCLUSION AND MANAGEMENT INTERPRETATION 
This study has shown that the independent audit committee has a significant 
influence on voluntary disclosure. This result is in accordance with the function of audit 
committee members (including the independent ones) in overseeing the financial reporting 
process and assisting in better disclosure of information to stakeholders. The study also 
found that independent audit committee has no significant effect on information 
asymmetry, which indicates that there is still a problem of information asymmetry in 
Indonesia banking sector stock market. This is supported by descriptive statistics which 
shown that the deviation standard data is greater than its average, it has a high data spread. 
The high voluntary disclosure and low information asymmetry (marked by a small 
share price spread) have made the banking stock market in Indonesia increasingly 
enthusiastic, increasing the volume of transaction. These results emphasize that adequate 
voluntary disclosure is indispensable to stimulate the stock market and increase the volume 
of transaction that will provide benefit to the company and its investors. This circumstance 
emphasizes that a satisfactory voluntary disclosure is absolutely necessary to stimulate the 
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stock market and increase the volume of transaction that will provide benefit to the 
company and its investors. 
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